Category: Application Security

  • Cloud Forensics Often Starts Before the Breach

    Cloud forensics often begins too late. A security team detects suspicious activity, opens an incident, and starts asking which logs exist, how long they have been retained, who can access them, and whether a compromised administrator could delete them. Responders discover that object-level access logging was never enabled, identity records expired weeks earlier, a container…

  • The Hidden Lateral-Movement Risk Inside Kubernetes Clusters

    Kubernetes is built to make communication between workloads simple. Pods receive routable IP addresses, Services provide stable endpoints, and internal DNS allows applications to locate one another without tracking where each container is running. Those features make distributed systems easier to operate, but they can also produce a broad internal attack surface when network controls…

  • Your CI/CD Pipeline Is a Production Access Path

    Continuous integration and continuous delivery are often described as engineering automation: code enters a repository, tests run, an artifact is built, and a release moves into an environment. That description is operationally correct, but it leaves out the security fact that matters most. A CI/CD workflow is also a programmable access path into production. Modern…

  • Netizen: Monday Security Brief (7/20/2026)

    Today’s Topics: Microsoft Maps Three Salesforce Attack Paths Tied to a Year of ShinyHunters Activity Threat actors linked through tactics, infrastructure, and public claims to the ShinyHunters data-extortion operation spent much of the past year gaining access to corporate Salesforce environments without exploiting a vulnerability in the platform itself. Their access came through trust relationships…

  • Why Software Supply Chain Security Cannot Stop at SBOMs

    Software bills of materials have become one of the most visible controls in software supply chain security. They provide a machine-readable inventory of the libraries, packages, modules, frameworks, and other components associated with a software product. When a new vulnerability is disclosed, an SBOM can help an organization determine which applications may contain the affected…

  • Visual Prompt Injection: How Malicious Instructions Hide in the Interface

    Prompt injection was first treated mainly as a text-security problem. An attacker typed a tempted to override its system rules, and tried to make the model produce restricted information or perform an unintended task. Multimodal models and computer-use agents have changed that threat model. Instructions no longer need to arrive through a chat box. They…

  • Microsoft July 2026 Patch Tuesday Fixes Record 570 Vulnerabilities, Including Three Zero-Days

    Microsoft’s July 2026 Patch Tuesday is the largest security release in the company’s history, delivering fixes for 570 vulnerabilities, including three zero-days. Two of the zero-days were actively exploited in the wild, while the third had been publicly disclosed before patches became available. The release also addresses 59 critical vulnerabilities, including 48 remote code execution…

  • Netizen: Monday Security Brief (7/13/2026)

    Today’s Topics: ATM Jackpotting Shows Why Encryption Wrappers Cannot Be Treated as a Final Defense ATM security often looks stronger from the outside than it is at the computing layer. The vault section is physically hardened, cash cassettes are protected, and forced entry into the lower half of the machine is difficult by design. The…

  • Remote MCP Servers Are Turning OAuth Into an AI Agent Security Boundary

    As AI agents move from chat interfaces into production systems, the security question is no longer limited to what a model can say. It is now also about what the agent can reach, what tools it can invoke, and which user-linked accounts sit behind those tool calls. That shift is what makes the Model Context…

  • AI Agent Security Needs to Move to the Tool-Call Boundary

    AI agents are becoming useful for the same reason they are becoming risky: they can act. They can browse websites, read files, call APIs, search repositories, invoke MCP servers, use skill files, modify documents, and trigger workflows across external systems. That makes them very different from older chatbot deployments, where most risk stayed inside the…